A Manchurian Candidate, as initially defined in Richard Condon's 1959 novel and the 1966 movie, is a nation’s leader controlled by that country’s enemy. These works of fiction played on the fear of a Communist takeover of America by Russia or China, a conspiracy worthy of being promoted by QAnon.
However, over time, the term has evolved to describe a leader who unwittingly or carelessly serves the interests of a foreign power in ways that harm his country’s interests. Today, critics view President Donald Trump’s policies in that light.
In fairness, every past president has made policy choices that, in hindsight, did not benefit America and may have even harmed it. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between making poor judgments and adopting positions that align with a central orientation that undermines our strength.
If a foreign power sought to undermine another country’s ability to counter its global influence, it would aim to reduce that country’s capacity to protect its interests beyond its borders. Recently, Foreign Affairs published two articles examining how President Donald Trump’s foreign policies impede our defense by embracing isolationist and anti-globalist beliefs, to the benefit of China and Russia’s expansionist agendas.
Former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell wrote The Price of American Retreat. McConnell represents traditional conservative positions, rejecting isolationism and supporting a strong global military presence. Professors Alexander Cooley from Barnard College and Daniel Nexon from Georgetown University wrote Trump's Antiliberal Order. They criticize Trump’s nationalist "America first" foreign policy for undercutting America’s advantage in foreign affairs. Although neither article hints at Trump being manipulated by a foreign power, they both recognize and detail how his approach works to the benefit of Russia and China.
McConnell begins his position by attacking past Democratic Presidents. That’s a safe place for any Republican to start, before criticizing the current leader of the Republican Party. He blames President Joe Biden’s administration for trying to manage foreign threats through engagement and accommodation. It only showed a weak America and whetted their appetite for greater hegemony.
He roasts President Barack Obama for failing to back up his foreign policy without sufficient investments in U.S. military power. He implies that, lacking a strong interventionist military, Biden could not enforce his own "red line" on Syria's use of chemical weapons. Although McConnell does not mention that Trump has failed to inform Russian President Vladimir Putin of any red line to cross for Russia to stop killing civilians in Ukraine.
McConnell also notes Obama's tepid response to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Obama initially responded with only minor sanctions targeting Russian individuals, state banks, and a handful of companies. However, by 2016, Obama had provided Ukraine with $600 million in security aid. Additionally, he pushed through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which provided U.S. military equipment and training to help defend Ukraine. So, Obama was slow in responding to Russian aggression and leaned on sanctions, but he did aid Ukraine’s resistance to the invasion.
Contrary to Obama’s orientation, the first Trump administration was more interventionist. He engaged the military in attacking Russia's ally Syria as a last resort for crossing the red line by using chemical weapons in their internal war.
However, in 2019, Trump withheld $400 million in security assistance to Ukraine, which was available under Obama’s legislation. He threatened to compromise Ukraine’s safety to pressure Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into announcing an investigation of Joe Biden, who challenged Trump in 2020. This wasn’t necessarily a favor to Russia but more of a personal benefit to Trump, allowing him to undermine Biden as a strong opponent to his reelection.
Although Trump and Biden differ in their approaches to balancing diplomacy and military intervention, they operated within the normal boundaries established by previous administrations.
That is also true for how Trump and previous administrations have handled military budget funding, which has fluctuated under Democrats and Republicans based on whether the country is at war or how the funds are allocated. Between 1987 and 1998, the defense budget declined for 11 consecutive years as Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton cut military spending during the winding down of the Cold War.
In the last year of Obama’s administration (2016), the defense budget accounted for 15.7% of the total federal budget. In Trump’s last year of his first term (2020), it was 10.0%, and in Biden’s last year (2024), it was 12.9%. Our regular defense budget has increased for 13 consecutive years under both Democratic and Republican presidents.
As a result, assessing the size of the defense budget isn’t relevant to a president's approach to national security. A more significant distinction lies in how presidents have interacted with our international framework of allied nations and organizations to sustain a viable military defense. In this context, Trump raises alarm bells for both McConnell and his critics.
McConnell avoids directly criticizing Trump; he consistently includes critiques of Democrats when commenting on Republicans and never mentions MAGA. While advocating for increased military spending to maintain global U.S. primacy, he also emphasizes the importance of foreign aid. He believes it must be purposefully integrated into great-power competition with China and Russia. McConnell views these countries as America’s biggest threat, writing that we “face linked threats even more potent than the Axis powers” of WWII.
By neglecting to collaborate with our allies on funding foreign aid, McConnell warns that we are allowing China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to gain more influence. America is already competing with China globally to create networks of nations and institutions that they can, if not control, significantly influence.
That competition can be observed in many regions, as America has active-duty military troops stationed in 178 countries, and at least 140 countries have signed cooperation agreements to engage with China in the BRI. As the U.S. distances itself from certain countries, China is ready to forge economic alliances with them. This approach enables China to avoid needing to deploy troops while still securing support in its competition with the U.S. in the global trade market.
If China were writing the U.S. budget, it would drastically cut foreign aid assistance to weaken the U.S. global network. Fortunately, China could rely on Trump. His Office of Management and Budget outlined 22 programs targeted by Trump in executive orders, and by DOGE, it cuts $8.3 billion, primarily aimed at foreign aid spending.
Republicans likely view this cut as not upsetting their voter base. Who is worried about reducing foreign aid? Any negative impact on our global competition will be in the future, possibly beyond the next presidential election. It’s typical corporate leadership thinking: produce a solid quarterly report to satisfy the stockholders (in this case, voters)—don’t fret about the future; you might be retired by then.
McConnell's other primary concern is that the Trump administration is disrupting the strength of Western economies by imposing tariffs. Rather than harnessing their economic power to cooperate with the U.S. in creating a stronger network that can oppose China’s economic expansion and Russia’s military incursions, Trump has “actively antagonized them,” straining relationships with allies.
McConnell warns that “this abdication was an invitation for China to expand its economic influence in Asia at the United States' expense.” He also attacks the MAGA Republicans for embracing isolationism, for it could lead to a Russian victory in Ukraine, which would damage the United States' interest in European security and compound the threats from China.
Although McConnell considers Iran becoming a more powerful supporter of Russian and Chinese aggression, he ignores how Trump’s transactional philosophy allows for that development. This can be seen in the most recent phone call between Putin and Trump, where Putin listened to Trump’s complaints about Russia bombing Ukrainian cities. Putin, according to Trump, then offered how he could help America in dealing with Iran.
It was a not-so-subtle offer for America to back off from supporting Ukraine in exchange for Russia helping Trump secure a better deal with Iran in his current negotiations with them. Incidentally, Iran’s main nuclear plants were built by the Russians, who would receive much-needed revenue from Iran if it contracted with them to keep its plants operating.
Putin and Trump understand how transactional relationships measure resources spent and gained in the Ukraine war, no B.S. about liberal principles. Russia and China operate on that level and recognize that with Trump as president, they can knock those principles out of America’s toolbox. Consequently, Russia and China are penetrating our democracy’s open portal of social media to support electing MAGA politicians who don’t obstruct their goals - see How Russia and China Pursue a Soft Regime Change in America.
This is why the piece by Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon is vital to read. It explains how Trump’s nationalist "America first" foreign policy plays into the hands of Russia and China. By elevating MAGA loyalists to cabinet positions, America’s foreign policy is now anchored in anti-globalism. His Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, described the United Nations as "a fully globalist organization that aggressively advances an anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-freedom agenda."
Meanwhile, China and Russia do not attack incumbent institutions like the UN but expand their influence over the organizations' staffing and policy priorities. They are making strides in organizations that shape global policies that Trump wishes to abandon. They couldn’t ask for more from a “Manchurian Candidate” as president.
Cooley and Nexon argue that China and Russia are capitalizing on U.S. conservatives' perceptions of the world, which interpret globalism as a liberal threat. They reinforce this perspective by cultivating the U.S. right with a superficial commitment to cultural conservatism. Russia, in particular, has pursued this strategy by assisting European far-right parties gain office through junkets, financial support, and propaganda.
That approach in America moves the Republican Party’s MAGA base increasingly toward viewing international institutions and treaty arrangements as anti-American. The practical effect is to gradually dismantle the global network that America helped establish after World War II, promoting economic and security agreements to America’s advantage.
The authors note that this network is a critical infrastructure of American power by establishing the norms and relationships providing America with unmatched influence that China and Russia need to carry out their foreign policy agenda.
The irony is that while MAGA Republicans criticize globalism and institutions that unite countries to share information and resources, China and Russia are expanding their influence within established multinational organizations initiated by America. Furthermore, they are creating their own equivalent network.
Their most ambitious effort was the creation of the BRICS organization, an intergovernmental entity comprising ten countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates—seven of which could be considered soft U.S. allies. They are now seeking more assistance from autocratic China and Russia than from democratic America. Cooley and Nexon identified five additional organizations in which the U.S. is not participating.
Cooley and Nexon are realists; they recognize that in the short term, if Trump withdraws from alliances and multilateral institutions, his purely transactional foreign policy may succeed in extracting greater concessions from countries that rely on U.S. security guarantees or cannot afford to lose access to American markets. However, great-power competition will provide many of those countries with exit options. This will increasingly occur in the coming years as America becomes less reliable in maintaining a stable trade market, with unpredictable changes in tariff charges.
The Republican Party's emphasis on financial commitments to security arrangements creates tension with NATO countries. This situation allows China and Russia to gain greater influence over once-stable U.S. allies. As the Republicans urge NATO members to increase their military spending, these countries may feel less reliant on America for maintaining a stable European continent. Competition among these nations could revert to a period that precipitated past world wars.
Cooley and Nexon conclude that if Trump's most transactional impulses become U.S. policy, the United States will need to spend more to receive less assistance from nations seeking alternative trade and defense partners. On a defense and economic level, Trump’s policies could unilaterally undermine the global infrastructure that enabled the United States to promote its core interests through prior periods of political upheaval.
As Mitch McConnell succinctly concluded, “If the United States continues to retreat, its enemies will be only too happy to fill the void.” They will not be pleased to see their candidate no longer serving as president.
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Nick Licata, a five-term Seattle City Council member, is the author of Becoming a Citizen Activist and Student Power: Democracy and Revolution in the Sixties. He is also the founding board chair of Local Progress, a network of 1,300 progressive municipal officials.